In its report, the [COLOR=#366388 ! important][COLOR=#366388 ! important]Financial [COLOR=#366388 ! important]Crisis [/COLOR][COLOR=#366388 ! important]Inquiry [/COLOR][COLOR=#366388 ! important]Commission[/COLOR][/COLOR][/COLOR] blames a range of obvious culprits: Banks that made reckless bets. Credit rating agencies that endorsed risky mortgage bonds. Government regulators who overlooked danger signs until they threatened the global financial system.
It concludes that the crisis might have been prevented if banks had been more careful and regulators had asked tougher questions.
Those views have long since become mainstream in the more than two years since the crisis peaked. Yet among panel members, they sowed dissension. In the end, the commission's six Democratic appointees embraced its conclusions. The four named by Republicans did not; they offered their own reasons for the crisis ? and three complained that the conclusions from the panel were too broad.
The absence of a clear and unifying message weakens the report's impact, analysts say.
"If only one side is picking and pulling different facts and trying to weave them into a narrative, you don't end up with a cohesive final product that's useful in policymaking," said Paul Atkins, a former member of the Securities and Exchange Commission.